MAY 8 - 2018

CLERK-OF THE COURT

Deputy Clerk

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO

UFCW & EMPLOYERS BENEFIT TRUST, et al..

Plaintiff,

Case No. CGC – 14-538451

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SUTTER HEALTH, ET AL.,

Defendants.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA EX REL. XAVIER

Plaintiff

VS.

SUTTER HEALTH, et al.,

Defendants

Case Number: CGC-18-565398

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE

Some seven years ago the California Attorney General (AG) opened a formal investigation of Sutter's managed care contracting. The People (through the AG) filed their suit on March 29, 2018. The People ask their case be consolidated with the pending *UEBT v. Sutter Health* case, No. 14-538451. I heard argument May 7, 2018.

It is obvious that the basic predicates for consolidation are met. For example, there are common issues of law and fact. C.C.P. § 1048(a). Courts have broad discretion to consolidate. *Morehart v. Cty. of Santa Barbara*, 7 Cal. 4th 725, 738 (1994), and the central question is whether, as a matter of practicality, and attending to any prejudice which may befall Sutter, I should consolidate.

Common Questions of Law or Fact. The benefit of consolidation is obvious, which is in short to avoid two exceedingly lengthy complex trials on the same issues.

There are common factual allegations between the two cases. Allegations include

(1) Sutter's market power stems from its dominance in certain Northern California markets

(UEBT Complaint ¶ 16, 21, 96; AG Complaint ¶ 31, 104); (2) Sutter's ability to impose

anticompetitive contract terms on Network Vendors and Sutter's excessive prices are direct

evidence of its market power (UEBT Complaint ¶ 69; AG Complaint ¶ 75); (3) Sutter's illegal

conduct presents barriers to entry to the hospital healthcare market (UEBT ¶ 94, AG ¶ 102); and

(4) Sutter's illegal conduct artificially inflates the prices of hospital healthcare providers above

competitive levels (UEBT ¶ 122, AG ¶ 74).

There are common legal issues in the two cases. Both allege causes of action under the Cartwright Act, for price tampering/fixing, unreasonable restraint of trade, and combination to monopolize. UEBT Complaint ¶¶ 137–60; AG Complaint ¶¶ 139–62. Both cases seek similar relief including (1) a declaration that Sutter's conduct constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade under the Cartwright Act, (2) disgorgement of overcharges Sutter imposed on self-funded payors, (3) injunctive relief, and (4) costs of the lawsuit. UEBT Complaint at 43–45; AG Complaint at 46–49.

Through their Reply and at argument the People confirmed that they would not seek to alter UEBT's market definitions. Not do the People seek damages, including disgorgement, different from that sought by UEBT. The People's complaint does allege (1) physician referrals enhance Sutter's market power (AG Complaint ¶¶ 31, 57, 63); (2) commercial insurance premiums are inflated due to Sutter's contracts (id. ¶¶ 5, 6, 30, 38, 73); (3) Sutter caused higher prices for outpatient services distinct from inpatient services (id. ¶ 86). But given (i) the People's

agreement not to notice separate discovery and (2) the bases for recovery sought by UEBT and the People's agreement not to expand on those, these distinctions are not enough to block consolidation. With consolidation, the People seek no more time for depositions or at trial. The current discovery deadlines will not be affected. And because the People have aligned their legal strategy with the UEBT class, consolidation will not force Sutter to argue inconsistent positions as between the two cases.

Impact of Attacks on People's Complaint. Sutter's likely attacks on the People's complaint will take time to resolve and so could have an impact on consolidation, but at this point the concern is speculative.

Delay. Regarding the People's delay in asking for consolidation, while the explanation offered by the People was vague, ¹ it is best to evaluate the issue through the lens of prejudice, that is, to ask how Sutter is more harmed by consolidation now than e.g., a year or two (or more) ago. I see none, give the concessions made the People discussed elsewhere in this order.

Jury Confusion. There is no good argument for jury confusion that cannot be ameliorated with instructions. Juries routinely handle multiple parties on a given side.

Relief Sought. I separately note Sutter's main concern—and indeed the apparent concern of amici²--which relates to the injunctive relief sought by the People. This does not affect consolidation because equitable relief including the sought-for injunctive relief will be dealt with after the jury returns its verdict on liability.³ If in fairness parties need further evidence to explain to me the impact of the requested injunction, I can then accommodate the parties. And as

¹ And without exposing attorney work product, perhaps necessarily so.

²The American Hospital Association (AHA) and the California Hospital Association (CHA) seek permission to file briefs. I have asked for declarations noting any connection between these amici and any parties before I grant that permission.

³ The parties will of course propose special jury verdict forms (and perhaps the less frequently used special jury interrogatories, although those can cause confusion, CAL. JUDGES BENCHBOOK CIV. PROC. TRIAL § 14.9 (2017)) designed to support or defeat requests for equitable relief.

to money damages, the People seek no money (as by way of equitable disgorgement) other than the sums sought by the UEBT class.

Binding jury verdict. Sutter suggests a second (bench) trial on the People's claims after the UEBT jury trial. The issue of the extent to which the jury verdict binds me as I consider the People's case for equitable relief is essentially the same whether I consolidate not; and the People have agreed to have me in a consolidated trial treat the jury verdict as binding; which I will.

Conclusion

The motion to consolidate this case with No. 18-565398 is granted and future filings will be filed in this case as the lead case, indicating it is consolidated with No. 18-565398.

Dated: May 7, 2018

Curtis E.A. Karnow Judge Of The Superior Court

CERTIFICATE OF ELECTRONIC SERVICE

(CCP 1010.6(6) & CRC 2.260(g))

I, DANIAL LEMIRE, a Deputy Clerk of the Superior Court of the County of San Francisco, certify that I am not a party to the within action.

On MAY 8 - 2018 , I electronically served THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT via File & ServeXpress on the recipients designated on the Transaction Receipt located on the File & ServeXpress website.

Dated:

MAY 8 - 2018

T. Michael Yuen, Clerk

DANIAL LEMIRE, Deputy Clerk