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7 **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT**  
8 **EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
9 **FRESNO DIVISION**

10 In re:

11 **MADERA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL,**  
12 **Debtor in Possession.**

13 Tax ID#: 23-6429117  
14 Address: 1250 E. Almond Avenue  
15 Madera, California 93637

Case No.: 23-10457

Chapter 11

DCN: PM-1

**OBJECTIONS TO CONFIRMATION OF  
SECOND AMENDED CHAPTER 11  
PLAN OF LIQUIDATION PROPOSED  
BY THE OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF  
UNSECURED CREDITORS**

Hearing Date: April 16, 2024

Time: 9:30 a.m.

Place: 2500 Tulare Street  
Courtroom 13

Fresno, California 93721

Judge: Hon. René Lastreto II

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20 Comes now Madera Coalition for Community Justice (MCCJ) and submits the  
21 following Objections to Confirmation of the Creditor Committee's Second Amended Chapter  
22 11 Plan of Liquidation. Supporting and documenting the Objections that follow are a Request  
23 for Judicial Notice, and Exhibits, filed and served herewith.

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1 **PRELIMINARY STATEMENT**

2 Resurrection of Madera Community Hospital is a critical community priority for  
3 Maderans—but only with a new operator that meets Maderans’ most pressing needs. Based on  
4 its record, American Advanced Management’s proposed Plan to reopen MCH is unlikely—  
5 either soon or over the long term, or successfully—to provide the most essential basic services  
6 of a safety-net hospital such as MCH.

7 MCCJ objects to the Plan on the grounds that it is not proposed in good faith, per  
8 §1129(a)(3): while casting itself as a successor to MCH, it does not commit to provide  
9 adequate services to an adequate number of patients; AAM’s track record and business  
10 practices raise serious questions about its intent in fact to meet community needs. Moreover,  
11 AAM’s true solvency is untested; the apparently frequency with which it has failed to pay taxes  
12 timely and to meet financial obligations short of litigation, give rise to legitimate concerns that  
13 if confirmed the Plan would put MCH at risk for liquidation or the need for further financial  
14 reorganization (§1129(a)(11)). Moreover, the Plan is incomplete, as it fails to require  
15 consideration of the UCSF/Adventist proposal as an alternative to liquidation if the AAM bid  
16 fails for some reason.

17 Finally, given that publicly available data<sup>1</sup> raise serious doubts about AAM’s capacity,  
18 and even intent, to operate a true safety-net hospital in Madera, if AAM’s Plan is to be  
19 approved, the approval must include imposition of significant new conditions.

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23 <sup>1</sup> Data cited herein are from multiple public sources, and supported by a Request for Judicial Notice, filed  
24 and served herewith. Data sources include: federal and state court records, California Department of  
Health Care Access and Information (HCAI), and California Department of Public Health (CDPH).  
HCAI data is submitted by each hospital under penalty of perjury.

1 **GROUNDS FOR OBJECTIONS**

2 **1. The Plan fails to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).**

3 The proponents of the Plan insist that its purpose is to allow reopening of MCH “to  
4 enable the Hospital to continue serving its community and its mission”<sup>2</sup> and to “continue serving  
5 its community and its underserved population.”<sup>3</sup> However, AAM’s Plan does not actually  
6 *commit as a condition of Plan confirmation* to operating Madera Community Hospital as the  
7 safety-net facility so essential to Madera’s underserved population. The Attorney General’s  
8 Conditions, and attached AAM Turnaround Plan, provide the only available insight into what  
9 MCH might look like as an operating hospital. But the gaps in service are deep and wide:  
10 Emergency Department, labor and delivery, General Surgery, laboratory, medical imaging—  
11 either not proposed at all (labor and delivery), or conditioned on whether AAM in its sole  
12 discretion determines MCH will be “sustainable” if offering them, or if offering them at an  
13 adequate level or to a degree that meets the needs of Maderans generally.<sup>4</sup>

14 Importantly, the Attorney General’s “conditions” identifying services to be rendered do  
15 not impose *requirements*, but are themselves conditioned on two things: AAM’s exercise of  
16 “Commercially Reasonable efforts,” and AAM’s determination in its sole discretion whether or

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19 <sup>2</sup> Docket No. 1298, Motion for Order Authorizing Debtor to Enter into a Master Transition Agreement  
and a Management Services Agreement with American Advanced Management, Inc., at p. 2, ¶ 1.

20 <sup>3</sup> *Id.* at p. 28, ¶ 31.

21 <sup>4</sup> “The Entities shall use Commercially Reasonable *efforts* to meet the following growth targets to  
22 introduce, maintain, and grow capabilities and capacities to furnish the following services at the Madera  
Campus within five (5) years from the Closing Date, provided that final determinations regarding specific  
services or service lines available at the Madera Campus shall be made by AAM *in its sole discretion*, and  
23 may be affected by demand for services in the Madera community and license requirements that may  
impact the nature of services that may be offered at the Madera Campus.” Docket No. 1415, Attorney  
24 General’s Conditions, Condition VII, p. 4 (PDF 12 of 151) [emphasis added]. Among the listed services  
which AAM may—or may not—eventually provide are “Basic, Level-3 emergency department, ...  
Inpatient and outpatient surgical services, ... Laboratory, medical imaging, ... specialty clinic services  
including prenatal care, surgical specialties, asthma care, and behavioral health services.” *Id.*

1 not to provide the services described. As a result, based on the Plan and AAM’s other filings in  
2 this matter, it is an egregious misrepresentation to describe the “reopened” hospital as a  
3 community-serving medical facility that will step into MCH’s role—absent firm and enforceable  
4 commitments by AAM, or imposition of new and enforceable conditions by the Court. To assert  
5 that this Plan will “reopen” MCH as a safety-net hospital, when the proposal in fact commits to  
6 no more than a stripped-down facility offering few of the essential services needed and serving a  
7 much-reduced patient population, amounts to a bait and switch scheme rather than a good faith  
8 proposal within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).

9 First, however, it is important to note that AAM explicitly acknowledges that *it cannot*  
10 *make this project work at all* unless it can reopen the Rural Health Clinic that had been located  
11 on the MCH campus. AAM also admits that “the location on the hospital campus in Madera  
12 would not currently qualify as a new clinic site.”<sup>5</sup> AAM hopes the site can be “grandfathered”  
13 into regulatory compliance, relying on having obtained such waivers in other takeovers, and on  
14 some “preparatory communications” between CEO Paolinelli and CMS,<sup>6</sup> but such a hope is at  
15 this point only speculative.

16 **Proposed condition of Confirmation:** Prior to judicial confirmation of the Plan, AAM  
17 must supply the Court with at least provisional CMS approval of its waiver request permitting  
18 operation of the clinic on the MCH campus.

19 **a. Labor and delivery**

20 Of MCH’s 106 beds, 23 were perinatal, and there were an additional 21 newborn nursery  
21 bassinets. HCAI utilization data show 700-800 births per year, with a relatively high incidence  
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24 <sup>5</sup> Docket No. 1415, AAM Madera Community Hospital Turnaround Plan, p. 1 (PDF 143).

<sup>6</sup> *Id.* at p. 2 (PDF 144).

1 of c-section deliveries and low-birth-weight babies.<sup>7</sup> HCAI patient discharge data for MCH from  
2 2020-2022 show 26% to 29% were perinatal patients. No labor and delivery services are  
3 available at any of AAM’s eight California hospitals.<sup>8</sup>

4 Although perinatal care was a key function of MCH, and clearly essential to the  
5 community at large, neither AAM’s Turnaround Plan nor the Attorney General’s Conditions  
6 require, or even propose, that AAM provide labor and delivery service. The Turnaround Plan  
7 notes that MCH’s labor and delivery program was a money-loser (\$4.5 million annually), and  
8 proposes that a Rural Health Clinic on-site at the MCH campus<sup>9</sup> will pick up some of the slack  
9 by offering prenatal care.<sup>10</sup> The Attorney General expects AAM to try to ensure that emergency  
10 department staff “can address specific emergency services needed by women,”<sup>11</sup> unaccountably  
11 without touching on the question of patients presenting in labor at the emergency department.

12 **Proposed condition of Confirmation:** As of the date of opening, and for a minimum of  
13 five years from that date, MCH must provide labor and delivery service, as well as prenatal and  
14 well-baby care.

15 **b. Emergency Department**

16 Until 2022, MCH’s annual Emergency Department volume averaged 30,000 patient  
17 visits; of these between 2,000 and 3,000 per year required admittance to the hospital.<sup>12</sup> MCH

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19 <sup>7</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to Request for Judicial Notice filed and served herewith: HCAI Annual  
20 Utilization Reports for Madera Community Hospital, 2019-2023 (Exhibits 2.A.1-4). The pertinent data  
21 appears in each report at Page 5 (1) – Surgery and Related Services, lines 20-22.

22 <sup>8</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith: to compare hospitals’ data, please refer  
23 to fn. 7, and for each AAM-affiliated hospital, please see Exhibits 2.B.1-7, reflecting the number of live  
24 births for each facility.

<sup>9</sup> This is true only if CMS grants permission to reopen the clinic on the MCH campus.

<sup>10</sup> Docket No. 1415, AAM Turnaround Plan at p. 5 (PDF 147).

<sup>11</sup> *Id.*, Attorney General’s Conditions, at p. 4, fn. 3 (PDF 12).

<sup>12</sup> *Please see*, MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN referenced at fn. 7. The data reflecting the number of Emergency  
Department visits and admits from the ED each year appear at Pages 4 (1), lines 21-30, of each report.

1 was licensed to provide Basic Emergency Services, which requires that a physician be on site  
2 24/7, and that a surgeon be available on call.<sup>13</sup>

3 The Attorney General's Conditions<sup>14</sup> suggest that MCH should have a Basic, Level 3  
4 Emergency Department that qualifies for licensure under California Code of Regulations, Title  
5 22, § 70411. However, this "condition" requires only that AAM use Commercially Reasonable  
6 efforts to provide Emergency Services (one of MCH's "growth targets"), allowing AAM in its  
7 sole discretion to decide whether or not to provide emergency services, and whether the services  
8 will be provided at Basic or Standby level.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, AAM does not include in its  
9 Turnaround Plan any application to California Department of Public Health to extend or renew  
10 MCH's permit to operate a Basic Level Emergency Department.<sup>16</sup>

11 A potentially bigger problem is that AAM is apparently entirely without experience  
12 operating a §70411-compliant Basic Level Emergency Department. None of AAM's eight  
13 hospitals has an emergency department licensed to provide Basic Emergency Medical Service.  
14 Of AAM's eight<sup>17</sup> facilities, four are Long Term Acute Care specialty hospitals, with no

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16 <sup>13</sup> California Code of Regulations, Title 22, § 70411, provides: "Basic Emergency Medical Service,  
17 Physician on Duty, Definition. Basic emergency medical service, physician on duty, means the provision  
18 of emergency medical care in a specifically designated area of the hospital which is staffed and equipped  
19 at all times to provide prompt care for any patient presenting with urgent medical problems."

18 <sup>14</sup> Docket No. 1415, Attorney General's Conditions, Condition VII, p. 4 (PDF 12).

19 <sup>15</sup> California Code of Regulations, Title 22, § 70649, provides: "Standby Emergency Medical Service,  
20 Physician on Call, Definition. Standby emergency medical service, physician on call, means the  
21 provision of emergency medical care in a specifically designated area of the hospital which is equipped  
22 and maintained at all times to receive patients with urgent medical problems and capable of providing  
23 physician service within a reasonable time."

21 <sup>16</sup> Docket No. 1415, AAM Turnaround Plan, p. 2 (PDF 144).

22 <sup>17</sup> This count includes three hospitals AAM claims to have added to its hospital system in 2023 – the  
23 Kentfield-Marín, Kentfield-San Francisco, and Orchard Hospital facilities. However, AAM  
24 affiliation/ownership information does not appear in the CDPH's Facility License, Management, or  
Ownership/Operator data records for those hospitals. Please see MCCJ's Exhibits to RJN filed and served  
herewith, Exhibits 3.A-C, CDPH records for these facilities, last accessed online February 26, 2024.  
Ownership/management information appears toward the bottom of the first/top of the second page of each  
of these reports.

1 emergency rooms. Among AAM’s remaining four hospitals, each provides only Standby  
2 Emergency Medical Service<sup>18</sup>, within the meaning of CCR Title 22, § 70649.

3 **Proposed condition of Confirmation:** As of the date of opening, MCH must have  
4 secured approval from CDPH to extend MCH’s permit to provide Basic Emergency Medical  
5 Service within the meaning of CCR § 70411, and for a minimum of five years must operate its  
6 Emergency Department consistently with the requirements of that permit.

7 **c. Surgery**

8 MCH had six operating rooms, providing both inpatient and outpatient surgical services  
9 to 4,000 to 5,000 patients per year (2019-2022)<sup>19</sup>. To provide emergency and inpatient surgical  
10 services is an essential function of a safety-net hospital.

11 However, the Attorney General’s Conditions require only that AAM use  
12 Commercially Reasonable efforts, and exercise its sole discretion whether, to “bring  
13 surgical, diagnostic and service capacity and surgery suites online at the Madera Campus  
14 consistent with patient demand and need.”<sup>20</sup> On pages 5 and 6 of the Turnaround Plan,  
15 AAM offers an “8 Year Service Line Growth Strategy,” listing General Surgery among  
16 the “longer term strategies” to be implemented “[a]fter the facility has successfully been  
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19 <sup>18</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith, HCAI Annual Utilization Reports for  
20 Madera Community Hospital, 2019-2023 (Exhibits 2.A.1-4), and for each AAM-affiliated hospital please  
21 see Exhibits 2.B.1-7, reflecting the Licensed Emergency Department Level which HCAI compiled from  
22 CDPH data. This information appears at Page 4 (1)-Emergency Dept Services (EDS), line 2, of each  
report. If the facility has an Emergency Department, line 2 will show Basic or Standby; a blank indicates  
no Emergency Department.

23 <sup>19</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith, HCAI Annual Utilization Reports for  
24 Madera Community Hospital (2019-2023), Exhibits 2.A.1-4. Data showing the number of surgeries, both  
inpatient and outpatient, each year, appear at Page 5 (1)-Surgery and Related Services, lines 1-2, in each  
report.

<sup>20</sup> Docket No. 1415, Attorney General’s Conditions, Condition VII, p. 4 (PDF 12).

1 reopened and stabilized (we believe this will take 2-3 year [sic]).”<sup>21</sup> Even then,  
2 implementation would depend on whether the additional services “make sense and meet a  
3 community need,” and at full capacity would serve only 1200 cases per year—a fraction  
4 of the established need.<sup>22</sup>

5 Any optimism about the likelihood that Madera’s only hospital will offer surgical  
6 services under the aegis of AAM is considerably dimmed with an examination of AAM’s  
7 practices, experience, and apparent business model. AAM’s eight hospitals provide no inpatient  
8 surgical services: six AAM hospitals have no operating rooms and provide no surgical services  
9 at all; the other two provide limited, outpatient-only surgical services<sup>23</sup>.

10 **Proposed condition of Confirmation:** As of the date of opening, MCH must reopen its  
11 six surgical suites, providing both inpatient and outpatient surgeries for a minimum of five years  
12 from the date of opening.

13 **d. Service to low-income patients**

14 Due to the poverty of the patient populations it serves, MCH’s payor mix has long  
15 skewed heavily to Medi-Cal and Medicare reimbursement for health care services. In a Report  
16 Prepared for the Office of the Attorney General during the time St. Agnes was proposing to  
17 acquire MCH, USC professor Dr. Glenn Melnick reported that, “In 2020, approximately one-  
18 third (31 percent) of MCH’s total charges are for Medicare patients and charges for Medi-Cal  
19 patients account for 50 percent. The Hospital participated in the Medicare and Medi-Cal

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21 <sup>21</sup> Docket No. 1415, AAM Turnaround Plan at pp. 5-6 (PDF 145-146).

22 <sup>22</sup> See HCAI Annual Utilization Reports referenced in fn. 19.

23 <sup>23</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith: HCAI Annual Utilization Reports for  
24 Madera Community Hospital, 2019-2023 (Exhibits 2.A.1-4); for each AAM-affiliated hospital please see  
Exhibits 2.B.1-7. Data reflecting the number of operating rooms appear at Page 5 (1)-Surgery and  
Related Services, lines 7-10, in each report; the number of inpatient and outpatient surgeries performed  
each year also appear on Page 5 (1), lines 1-2.



1 programs through both fee-for-service contracts as well as managed care contracts.”<sup>24</sup>

2 The Attorney General’s Conditions do require that AAM maintain participation in  
3 Medicare and Medi-Cal programs (Condition XI), provide charity care at MCH (Condition XII),  
4 and take affirmative steps to ensure indigent patients are informed of MCH’s Financial  
5 Assistance policy so they can apply for charity care when appropriate (Condition XIII).<sup>25</sup>

6 However, AAM has minimal experience serving low-income populations: HCAI data  
7 show most AAM facilities with extremely low Medi-Cal discharges and Medi-Cal revenues  
8 Most AAM facilities have limited, if any, Managed Care revenue from serving patients in  
9 managed care plans.<sup>26</sup>

10 **Proposed condition of Confirmation:** Prior to judicial confirmation of the Plan, AAM  
11 must provide documentation of the steps it has taken at MCH to ensure it can manage and meet  
12 the unique demands of Medi-Cal fee-for-service and managed care reimbursement mechanisms,  
13 in order to ensure that MCH will be ready, willing and able to serve low-income populations.

14 **e. Ethical concerns**

15 A due-diligence review of Dr. Singh’s and AAM’s business practices leads the researcher  
16 directly into a truly confounding number of allegations of dishonesty, fraud, perjury, and  
17 maladministration. MCCJ will spare the Court anything like a full review of the litigation and  
18 regulatory disciplinary action that appear in the public record. But the bare quantity of Dr.

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20 <sup>24</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith, Exhibit 7, “Assessment of the Effects of  
21 the Proposed Acquisition of Madera Community Hospital by St. Agnes Medical Center. Prepared for the  
22 Office of the Attorney General. Version 7.7.2022.” by Glenn Melnick, Ph.D., July 7, 2022, at PDF p. 342  
(p. 70 of the Report).

<sup>25</sup> Docket No. 1415, Attorney General’s Conditions, pp. 6-7 (PDF 14-15).

<sup>26</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith, Exhibit 2.C.1-8, HCAI pivot tables  
23 showing HCAI hospital annual financial data file for Madera Community Hospital and the 5 AAM-  
24 affiliated hospitals for 2022, detailing by payor group Gross Revenues, Net Revenues, Discharges, Patient  
Days, and Outpatient Visits.

1 Singh’s legal entanglements reveals a troubling pattern of bad faith business dealings, and  
2 failures to comply with tax and regulatory responsibilities. Final judicial rulings on the issues  
3 are few, since most cases were settled before a definitive determination on their merits.  
4 Therefore, this submittal limits to four the examples of AAM conduct that give rise to doubts  
5 about the good faith with which the proffered Plan to “reopen” MCH is proposed.

6 (i) **In re: Sonoma West Medical Center, Inc., Bankr. N.D.Cal., Ch. 7, No. 18-**  
7 **10665; Timothy W. Hoffman, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of Sonoma**  
8 **West Medical Center v. Sonoma Specialty Hospital, LLC, et al, A.P. No. 19-**  
9 **1030.**

10 On September 8, 2018, Dr. Singh, through his American Advanced Management  
11 Group (AAMG), entered into an agreement with Palm Drive Healthcare District to  
12 provide hospital management services to bankruptcy Debtor Sonoma West Medical  
13 Center. In August of 2019, Debtor’s Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding  
14 against Singh, AAMG, and subsidiary Sonoma Specialty Hospital, LLC (SSH)<sup>27</sup>, seeking  
15 turnover of property of the estate, an accounting for receivables collected and used since  
16 September 9, 2018, and damages for conversion of property of the estate.

17 After a four-day trial on the question of ownership, the Bankruptcy Court held  
18 that the Debtor’s Trustee, and not SSH, was the owner of receivables that accrued prior to  
19 the date AAMG/SSH assumed management of the facility but that were received  
20 afterwards. The Court emphatically rejected (as “ridiculous”) SSH’s claim that it had  
21 rights to the receivables, but no responsibility to pay debts created in rendering those  
22 services.<sup>28</sup>

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23 <sup>27</sup> According to the California Department of Public Health, SSH is wholly owned by Dr. Singh, who is  
24 likewise the principal of AAMI. Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith, Exhibit  
3.D; ownership/management information is at the bottom of the first page.

<sup>28</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith, Exhibit 4.A, Memorandum Decision  
Following Trial on Threshold Issue, filed February 23, 2021, at Exhibit pp. 150-151.

1           Eight months later—after another trial, this time to determine damages—the  
2 Bankruptcy Court ruled that the Debtor’s Trustee was entitled to retrieve the funds SSH  
3 had “wrongfully appropriated.”<sup>29</sup> Among the Court’s findings of fact: SSH began using  
4 the Debtor’s DDA bank account without the Trustee’s knowledge or consent<sup>30</sup>; SSH  
5 falsely claimed to be the owner of “most of the money in this account”<sup>31</sup>; and SSH  
6 untruthfully informed the Trustee that SSH had no way to differentiate between funds  
7 received prior to transfer of management to SSH and those received after<sup>32</sup>.

8           The Court repudiated SSH’s arguments as “without merit”<sup>33</sup> and ruled for the  
9 Debtor’s Trustee on all claims. The judgment ordered recovery to Debtor’s Trustee of  
10 \$2,581,222.80 and dismissed defendants’ counterclaim in its entirety and with  
11 prejudice.<sup>34</sup> The Court issued an Amended Judgment pursuant to the parties’ settlement  
12 agreement after an installment payment had been made, awarding a somewhat reduced  
13 amount of \$1,150,000.<sup>35</sup>

14           **(ii) Michelle Baass, Director of the California Department of Health Care**  
15           **Services, vs. Sonoma Specialty Hospital, LLC; American Advanced**  
16           **Management Group, Inc.; and Gurpreet Singh, Case No. SCV-270916,**  
17           **Sonoma County Superior Court**

18           SSH eventually converted to a private hospital, in April of 2019, and at that point  
19 became ineligible for PRIME funding, a publicly-funded incentive program for public

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20 <sup>29</sup> *Id.*, Exhibit 4.B, Memorandum Decision Regarding Plaintiff’s Damages, filed October 22, 2021, at  
21 Exhibit p. 161.

22 <sup>30</sup> *Id.*, Exhibit p. 164. The purpose of a “DDA Account” is for deposit of funds from the U.S. Center for  
23 Medicare and Medicaid Services.

24 <sup>31</sup> *Id.*, p. Exhibit p. 165.

<sup>32</sup> *Id.*, p. Exhibit p. 167.

<sup>33</sup> *Id.*, Exhibit pp. 172, 176, 177, 185.

<sup>34</sup> *Id.*, Exhibit 4.C, Judgment, filed October 27, 2021, at p. 192.

<sup>35</sup> *Id.*, Exhibit 4.D, Amended Judgment, filed November 30, 2021, at p. 196.

1 hospitals providing care to Medi-Cal patients. According to the complaint filed in May  
2 of 2022 by California Department of Health Care Services (DHCS), SSH “failed to  
3 timely notify DHCS of its conversion and breached its Medi-Cal provider agreement by  
4 improperly accepting federal program funds and by subsequently refusing to remit the  
5 amount it was overpaid.”<sup>36</sup> DHCS sought recoupment of \$270,000.

6 On February 23, 2024, the Superior Court granted DHCS’s motion for summary  
7 judgment, noting “the parties do not disagree on the facts,” and rejecting the Singh  
8 parties’ arguments claiming SSH’s eligibility for PRIME dollars continued even after the  
9 date of the change of ownership that converted SSH to a private hospital.<sup>37</sup>

10 **(iii) In the Matter of the Accusation Against Advanced College; Jusrand LLC –**  
11 **Gurpreet Singh, Owner; Before the California Department of Consumer**  
12 **Affairs for the Bureau for Private Postsecondary Education, Case No.**  
13 **BPPE22-023**

14 Beginning in July of 1999, Dr. Singh began operating Advanced College  
15 (Advanced), a private for-profit vocational nursing school, which eventually had three  
16 campuses, in Salida, Stockton, and South Gate in Southern California.<sup>38</sup> On December  
17 22, 2021, the Bureau for Private Postsecondary Education (BPPE) received notice from  
18 the United States Department of Education that the DOE had denied Advanced’s  
19 application for continued participation in federal student financial assistance programs.  
20 The DOE determination was based on multiple grounds, including failure to make timely  
21 refunds to students, submission of false information to DOE investigators, and failures to

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22 <sup>36</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith, Exhibit 5.A, Complaint for Recoupment,  
Breach of Contract, declaratory Relief, and Unjust Enrichment, filed May 31, 2022.

23 <sup>37</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith, Exhibit 5.B, Minute order adopting  
tentative ruling granting plaintiff DHCS’s motion for summary judgment, filed February 23, 2024.

24 <sup>38</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith, Exhibit 6, Default Decision and Order,  
dated January 20, 2023, Exhibit p. 236, ¶ 2.

1 demonstrate financial responsibility and administrative capacity.<sup>39</sup>

2 Almost a full year later, on December 8, 2022, after its own investigation, BPPE  
3 itself issued a Notice and Emergency Decision to shut down Advanced’s operations  
4 effective December 19. Dr. Singh did not seek administrative review of the sudden  
5 closure.

6 On December 19, 2022, the BPPE filed an Accusation<sup>40</sup>, seeking revocation or  
7 suspension of Advanced’s Approval to Operate, and an order that Advanced pay the  
8 BPPE reasonable costs of investigation and enforcement. Dr. Singh never responded to  
9 the Accusation, though he was served the same day the Accusation was filed.

10 On January 20, 2023, the BPPE found Dr. Singh to be in default, and “based on  
11 the relevant evidence contained in the Default Decision Investigatory Evidence Packet in  
12 this matter, finds that the charges and allegations in Accusation Number BPPE22-023,  
13 are separately and severally, found to be true and correct by clear and convincing  
14 evidence.”<sup>41</sup> The BPPE assessed costs of investigation and enforcement against Dr.  
15 Singh, in the amount of \$32,569.75.<sup>42</sup>

16 BPPE’s investigation, detailed in the Accusation (Exhibit A to the Default  
17 Decision and Order), revealed falsification of documents, including overcharges for fees;  
18 charges for uniforms, books, services, and supplies that were never provided; falsification  
19 of applicant test scores; and falsification of records of attendance, falsely showing that  
20 students had completed rotations when they had not.<sup>43</sup>

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22 <sup>39</sup> *Id.*, Exhibit A—Accusation Number BPPE22-023, Exhibit p. 257, ¶ 38.

23 <sup>40</sup> *Id.*, Exhibit A—Accusation, Exhibit pp. 241-272.

24 <sup>41</sup> *Id.*, Default Decision and Order, Exhibit p. 237, ¶ 8.

<sup>42</sup> *Id.*, ¶ 9.

<sup>43</sup> *Id.*, Exhibit A—Accusation, Exhibit pp. 259-262, *passim*.

1           Of particular relevance to AAM’s viability as an operator of Madera Community  
2 Hospital, BPPE found that bank statements and operational expense reports showed  
3 Advanced was likely to be insolvent within six months, and was regularly failing to meet  
4 financial responsibilities such as payment of vendors, timely payroll disbursements, and  
5 making refunds when due, or at all.<sup>44</sup>

6           The school on every level was a failure—administratively, financially, and  
7 educationally. The BPPE findings point to cynical fraud: a money-extraction machine  
8 masquerading as a school, but a school that failed to provide instructors, materials, or  
9 equipment.<sup>45</sup> Advanced knowingly sucked in the unqualified and the ineligible, students  
10 who failed basic entrance examinations and who could not participate in externships  
11 because they would not pass background checks needed for employment.<sup>46</sup> Advanced  
12 took their tuition money, and gave them little or nothing of value.

13           MCCJ is alarmed to consider that Dr. Singh, Advanced’s owner and operator,  
14 proposes now to operate and perhaps own Madera Community Hospital. Putting the  
15 most charitable construction on it, Dr. Singh was incompetent to run Advanced—to  
16 protect these vulnerable students’ investments in their future by ensuring that Advanced  
17 met the many standards, requirements, and regulatory strictures imposed on a vocational  
18 nursing school. A full service general acute hospital is much more complicated to run,  
19 and failures are often literally fatal. An incompetent should not be allowed control of  
20 MCH.

21           But this does not seem to be a case of negligent incompetence: Dr. Singh had a  
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23 <sup>44</sup> *Id.*, Exhibit pp. 262-263.

24 <sup>45</sup> *Id.*, Exhibit pp. 263-266.

<sup>46</sup> *Id.*, Exhibit pp. 266-272.

1 full year between the federal DOE termination of Advanced’s participation in student  
2 loan programs and the BPPE emergency order shutting Advanced College down entirely.  
3 The BPPE investigation uncovered the same failures as the DOE investigation had done.  
4 Dr. Singh had apparently done nothing in the interim to correct the problems in the  
5 intervening year—which suggests either a willingness to tolerate his institution’s abysmal  
6 failures, or an unscrupulous desire to extract maximum dollars from unsuspecting  
7 students. This cannot be the ethos under which MCH is operated in future.

8 **Proposed conditions of Confirmation:** MCCJ respectfully requests that this Court  
9 maintain jurisdiction over this case for at least five years after Confirmation of a Plan, requiring:

10 1) a report every six months comprising an audited accounting, verified and  
11 approved by the Attorney General and the California Treasurer’s Health Facilities Financing  
12 Authority, for:

13 • all funding MCH receives from the Distressed Hospitals Fund, documenting that every  
14 dollar of the funding is spent for the direct benefit of MCH;

15 • all funding MCH receives through any and all sources of supplemental Medi-Cal  
16 payment, including but not limited to Disproportionate Share Hospital or Medi-Cal Hospital  
17 Quality Assurance Fund programs, to document that all such funding is expended at and for  
18 MCH directly to improve access to and quality of medical care for vulnerable Madera residents.

19 2) an annual review by the California Department of Public Health of MCH’s  
20 operations and cash flow, so as to satisfy itself that AAM is operating MCH in a competent and  
21 ethical manner.

22 **2. The Plan fails to comply with 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11).**

23 The throughline in MCCJ’s Objections raised in Section 1, *supra*, is AAM’s single-  
24 minded commitment to maximizing profit, even at the expense of compliance with regulatory

1 constraints, and/or the competent and professional provision of the services its businesses are  
2 legally and morally obligated to supply. At every turn, AAM appears to choose the cheaper and  
3 more profitable business model, without regard to the impact on the populations it claims to  
4 serve. As criminal court sentencing judges are well aware, the best predictor of future conduct is  
5 past behavior: based on AAM's preferred business model and ethically questionable business  
6 practices, MCCJ anticipates that Confirmation of the proposed Plan is very likely to be followed  
7 by liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of MCH or of AAM if it assumes  
8 ownership of MCH.

9 **MCCJ bases this Objection on the following facts:**

- 10 • **Dozens of red flags, in the form of many tax liens, and dozens of lawsuits against**  
11 **Dr. Singh and his many businesses seeking payment of past-due amounts or**  
12 **alleging fraud, breach of contract, and Labor Code violations, among other**  
13 **claims**

14 Even in the very few instances enumerated in Section 1.e. of these Objections, *supra*,  
15 AAM conducted itself, and took legal positions, incompatible with pertinent regulations and  
16 basic contract law. Such repeated and apparently irrational refusals to loosen their grasp of  
17 money to which they had no plausible claim, together with the BPPE finding that Advanced  
18 College was on the brink of insolvency, leads a reasonably attentive observer to wonder whether  
19 AAM is actually able to invest the resources it claims it has at its disposal for reopening and  
20 operating Madera Community Hospital.

21 Additional urgent questions are raised by the Notices of Federal Tax Liens collected at  
22 Exhibit 8<sup>47</sup> of the Request for Judicial Notice. First, MCCJ wishes to make clear that it does not  
23 assume these tax liens are still pending—they very well may have been cleared by now, but that  
24 is not our point. Our concern is that federal Internal Revenue Service enforcement was

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<sup>47</sup> Please see MCCJ's Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith, Exhibit 8, pp. 424-434.



1 necessary at all. Wrongfully unpaid obligations included federal income tax (Internal Revenue  
2 Code § 1040)<sup>48</sup>, taxes withheld from employees’ paychecks (deductions for income taxes, Social  
3 Security, or Medicare) (IRC § 941)<sup>49</sup>, and the employer's portion of Social Security or Medicare  
4 tax (IRC § 940)<sup>50</sup>. In addition, there are recorded tax liens for a total of \$148,843.67 in IRS  
5 penalties<sup>51</sup> based on a finding of willful failure to collect tax, to account for and pay tax, or to  
6 “attempt in any manner to evade or defeat tax or the payment thereof.” (Internal Revenue Code,  
7 § 6672.) The total liens assessed—and these are just the ones we found Monday afternoon in the  
8 Stanislaus County Clerk-Recorder’s office—totaled \$4,102,105.97 over the period they were  
9 recorded, from September 7, 2018 to January 19, 2023.

10         The number and quantity of these liens signals either a business owner who is unable to  
11 manage acquisitions, operations, and cash flow so as to meet his financial responsibilities, or a  
12 business owner who prefers to exploit the present value of his cash, and can absorb almost  
13 \$150,000 in IRS penalties as a mere cost of doing business. Neither of these business models is  
14 appropriate for the operator of a health care facility such as Madera residents need MCH to be.

15         Similarly, the sheer volume of cases collected at Exhibit 9<sup>52</sup>—again, uncovered in a very  
16 short time frame and without access to special databases or investigators—alarms the reasonable  
17 observer. As with the tax liens, MCCJ does not assume that Dr. Singh and his businesses were  
18 in fact liable for all the sums they were sued for. As noted earlier, most cases seemed to settle,  
19 though often rather late in the process. So it may be that his method is to force his creditors to  
20 invest additional sums in lawyers to retrieve amounts owed, while he makes use of the cash he

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21  
22 <sup>48</sup> *Id.*, at 429-430.

23 <sup>49</sup> *Id.*, at 434.

24 <sup>50</sup> *Id.*

<sup>51</sup> *Id.*, at 431-432.

<sup>52</sup> Please see MCCJ’s Exhibits to RJN filed and served herewith, Exhibit 9, pp. 435-440.

1 would otherwise have had to pay them. Or it may be that cash flow is so tight, and so uncertain,  
2 that Dr. Singh cannot manage to operate his many businesses and also avoid lawsuits involving  
3 them.

4 Either way, this cavalier mode of doing business is not promising for MCH's financial  
5 stability and the quality of its care, such that confirmation of the plan is likely to be followed by  
6 the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to  
7 the debtor under the Plan.

- 8 • **AAM's demonstrated lack of experience, interest, or capacity to operate a full-**  
9 **service hospital serving a low-income and MediCal-dependent population**  
10 **requiring medical services which may not be profitable, such as labor and**  
11 **delivery, a 24/7 physician-staffed Emergency Department, and inpatient surgical**  
12 **service**

13 AAM's disinclination to provide the essential services at the very core of a safety net  
14 hospital's mission is apparent from a cursory examination of AAM's current holdings: none  
15 provide labor and delivery service, none provide Basic Emergency Department service, none  
16 provide inpatient surgery, and only two have Medi-Cal managed care contracts or provide  
17 significant levels even of fee-for-service care to Medi-Cal patients.

18 The Plan now before this Court for Confirmation does not in fact commit AAM to  
19 provide these services to this population; AAM's evident lack of interest, let alone enthusiasm,  
20 for serving low-income patients, together with its demonstrated ruthless dedication to  
21 maximizing its profits, do not bode well for Maderans unable to cough up private insurance-level  
22 payments for medical care.

- 23 • **AAM's demonstrated lack of experience, interest, or capacity to handle**  
24 **intricacies of Medi-Cal billing and reimbursement**

As AAM has added health care facilities to its portfolio, often out of bankruptcy, it has  
tended to convert them to operations with high levels of Medicare and/or private insurance  
reimbursement. As a result, AAM's experience with Medi-Cal billing has been limited, resulting

1 in expensive operational and administrative blunders.

2 For example, the entanglements AAM experienced with DHCS and Trustee Timothy  
3 Hoffman could, if we were generous-minded, be attributable to the ignorance an aggressively  
4 for-profit entity might suffer when confronted with the dizzyingly numerous requirements of  
5 programs that reimburse medical care from public funds. Such ignorance is an indicator of  
6 incompetence, but not necessarily of bad faith.

7 In these two instances however, both DHCS and Trustee Hoffman provided Dr. Singh  
8 and his wholly-owned subsidiaries AAMG and SSH plenty of notice of their concerns and the  
9 legal bases for their positions. We can justifiably infer a lack of interest in observing regulatory  
10 strictures from Dr. Singh's choice to litigate to retain control of funds to which his businesses  
11 absolutely and clearly had no legal right.

12 MCH has landed itself in bankruptcy court because it was inept in its attempts to navigate  
13 the complexities of negotiations with insurers, and the requirements of Medi-Cal, Medi-Cal  
14 managed care, and the attendant reimbursement and supplement programs. AAM appears to be  
15 even less experienced, and less interested, in learning these skills so essential to successful  
16 operation of a safety net hospital in Madera.

17 **Proposed condition of Confirmation:** MCCJ respectfully requests that prior to  
18 confirming the proposed Plan this Court require AAM to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the  
19 Attorney General, HCAI, and CHFFA that AAM has adequate resources to dedicate to MCH, *as*  
20 *well as* to its other businesses and medical care facilities.

21 **3. The Plan is incomplete, because it fails to explicitly identify the UCSF/Adventist bid as**  
22 **a potential liquidation option.**

1 Both the Second Amended Chapter 11 Liquidation Plan<sup>53</sup> and the Third Amended  
2 Disclosure Statement<sup>54</sup> provide for a pivot to a Liquidation Transaction if the MTA is terminated  
3 and/or the Committee in its sole discretion determines that liquidation is in the best interests of  
4 the Creditors. As Counsel for Madera County pointed out during the February 27 hearing, there  
5 is another option: the proposal proffered by UCSF and Adventist Health. The Plan is  
6 incomplete, in that it does not acknowledge that option, and does not require that the Committee  
7 give it fair consideration.

8 **Proposed condition of Confirmation:** MCCJ respectfully requests that prior to  
9 Confirmation the Plan be amended to incorporate explicit reference to the UCSF/Adventist  
10 proposal, and to require reasonable and fair consideration of that proposal prior to any pivot to  
11 liquidation.

12 **4. Madera Coalition for Community Justice is an interested party in these proceedings.**

13 MCCJ is an interested party in these proceedings in its role as representative of Madera  
14 County residents' intense concern about the fate of their hospital. Those residents must ask:  
15 who is responsible for the due diligence here? We do not expect the Creditors' Committee to  
16 look AAM's gift horse in the mouth. That is not their job, and we understand and respect that  
17 their first responsibility is to recoup what MCH has owed them all for so long.

18 We also understand that our standing to raise these issues is not indisputable. But we  
19 point out respectfully that whether or not MCCJ itself has standing to say so, the Court must  
20 make an evidence-based determination that the provisions of § 1129 have been met.<sup>55</sup> Section

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21  
22 53 Docket No. 1507, Redline Second Amended Chapter 11 Liquidation Plan, at p. 30 (PDF 37).

23 54 Docket No. 1506, Redline Third Amended Disclosure Statement, at p. 35 (PDF 50).

24 <sup>55</sup> See, e.g., *Big Shanty Land Corp. v. Comer Properties, Inc.*, N.D.Ga.1985, 61 B.R. 272. [Even if unsuccessful bidder did not have standing to object to proposed reorganization plan, bankruptcy court had independent duty to subject it to Chapter 11 safeguards, and determine if plan was submitted in good faith.]

1 1129’s requirement that a Liquidation Plan be proffered in good faith requires evidence of a  
2 Plan’s feasibility, and that the Plan proponent is not “dishonest in any way.” *See, e.g., In re*  
3 *Koelbl* (2d Cir. 1984) 751 F.2d 137, 139. At this point, the record is devoid of the evidence of  
4 solvency and financial solidity that would support a finding that the AAM Plan is feasible, and  
5 MCCJ has proffered evidence of dishonesty that is worthy of evidentiary testing in a hearing.

6 Finally, we must say to this Court: we fervently hope it will not be the case that MCH  
7 will be turned over to AAM without regard to the quality of stewardship AAM is likely to  
8 provide for Madera’s one hospital and the health of the Madera community. We request that the  
9 Court scrutinize carefully AAM’s representations, and subject them to evidentiary proof, before  
10 making this enormously consequential decision. If the Court does determine to confirm the Plan,  
11 MCCJ requests that it impose enforceable conditions upon AAM in order to protect the interests  
12 of Madera’s population.

13 DATED:

Respectfully submitted,

14 /s/ Patience Milrod

15 Patience Milrod  
16 Attorney for  
Madera Coalition for Community Justice